posted
JB, lots and lots to ponder, but I'm kind of stuck way back here:
Phil: So could it not be said that the various entities in a dualistic universe affect each other through the exercise of their being?
JB: The skeptic would rightly consider that to be a tad tautological.
You sent me running to the dictionary, here, to see what sense you might be intending by "tautological." I checked it out and am confused.
My point was in response to your earlier one, wherein you had stated that dualism is untenable because of causal disjunction. Maybe I don't know what was implied; I took "causal disjunction" to mean that dualism doesn't account for how beings affect each other, even causally. If that's not the formal, philosophical meaning of "causal disjunction," then I don't know what you mean. In either case, I was only trying to state what seems to me to be obvious: that creatures affect one another through their behavior, which would seem fill any causal vacuums that might be supposed to exist.
I would say that your follow-up point about Aristotle doesn't do justice to his view of beings. While substantialistic, they do not deny the influence beings can have upon one another.
Again, I realize that the problem might be a misunderstanding of your terminology. I am at a disadvantage here in my lack of familiarity with some of the philosophical shorthand (especially "causal disjunction").
[ April 11, 2005, 08:10 PM: Message edited by: Phil ]
-------------------- "The Light shines on in darkness . . ." - John 1: 3 - Posts: 7539 | From: Wichita, KS | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
re: I took "causal disjunction" to mean that dualism doesn't account for how beings affect each other, even causally. If that's not the formal, philosophical meaning of "causal disjunction," then I don't know what you mean.
Yeah, that sounds close enough.
In either case, I was only trying to state what seems to me to be obvious: that creatures affect one another through their behavior, which would seem fill any causal vacuums that might be supposed to exist.
There are many types of dualism, like Cartesian dualism and substance dualism. There are many different philosophies of mind, too, including naturalistic dualism, where consciousness would be a primitive alongside space, time, mass and energy.
It all depends on what you meant by being and creatures and also by dualism. Do you include supernatural creatures and immaterial substances, for example? Do souls exist apart from bodies?
While it is obvious enough that beings affect beings and creatures affect creatures, it is perhaps more obvious how physical entities and energetic entities affect other physical and energetic entities, less obvious how nonphysical and immaterial entities would affect physical and material entities. Not to say I didn't take a valiant stab at same vis a vis my many examples. I just cannot and do not claim to have comprehensively or exhaustively addressed all problems of physical causal closure for dualistic and pluralistic accounts. I do like the heuristic value of an analogy of being and find it intelligible that we can observe effects and infer from them the existence of something causal or even cause-like, even as we cannot determine or comprehend the essential nature of such. But that does not suffice as an explanation. To say that beings affect beings and x and y are beings therefore x affects y, when x is material or physical and y is immaterial or nonphysical is tautological, question begging.
I would say that your follow-up point about Aristotle doesn't do justice to his view of beings. While substantialistic, they do not deny the influence beings can have upon one another.
I assume you are talking about my follow-up point to your statement: But this would not invalidate dualism, unless by such one means only static, inert beings. --- where I had written this:
quote: That's a good qualification and one of the reasons folks have had problems with classical aristotelianism and thomism. They were too substantialistic and implastic. Folks like Arraj have largely corrected that with a more robust and dynamic conceptualization of formative causation. Others have adopted more of a process-substantialist approach over against those that would still be considered too essentialistic, for some substance approaches, or nominalistic, for some process approaches, like Whitehead. Part of the problem has been that some have viewed thomism as a straightforward rendering of aristotelianism but that is decidedly not so, especially if existence, or esse, takes primacy over essence.
The substantialistic criticism does not have anything to do with causal efficacy of being on being. Of course Aristotle doesn't deny the influence of beings on one another. Any criticism would come from the opposite direction, in fact, that he goes to far in invoking their causal efficacy on one another. Again, vis a vis immaterial vs material. Science hasn't had much use, for example, for hundreds of years, for anything but efficient causation. Who needs formal and material and final causation? (Don't answer that. I rather like them myself, in a nunaced way.) Also, the criticism would have more so to do with what you talked about re: being too static and would have to do with being, as they say, too essentialistic. Those criticisms stick more to Aristotle and not Aquinas because Aquinas, properly considered, doesn't, in my view, mistreat the idea of essence, and further, there is no reason it cannot be viewed more dynamically (a la Arraj, for example).
Maybe Bernie can better address the causal closure issues since he seems to raise the objection more vigorously than I do, I suspect.
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
re: I took "causal disjunction" to mean that dualism doesn't account for how beings affect each other, even causally. If that's not the formal, philosophical meaning of "causal disjunction," then I don't know what you mean.
Yeah, that sounds close enough.
In either case, I was only trying to state what seems to me to be obvious: that creatures affect one another through their behavior, which would seem fill any causal vacuums that might be supposed to exist.
There are many types of dualism, like Cartesian dualism and substance dualism. There are many different philosophies of mind, too, including naturalistic dualism, where consciousness would be a primitive alongside space, time, mass and energy.
It all depends on what you meant by being and creatures and also by dualism. Do you include supernatural creatures and immaterial substances, for example? Do souls exist apart from bodies?
While it is obvious enough that beings affect beings and creatures affect creatures, it is perhaps more obvious how physical entities and energetic entities affect other physical and energetic entities, less obvious how nonphysical and immaterial entities would affect physical and material entities. Not to say I didn't take a valiant stab at same vis a vis my many examples. I just cannot and do not claim to have comprehensively or exhaustively addressed all problems of physical causal closure for dualistic and pluralistic accounts. I do like the heuristic value of an analogy of being and find it intelligible that we can observe effects and infer from them the existence of something causal or even cause-like, even as we cannot determine or comprehend the essential nature of such. But that does not suffice as an explanation. To say that beings affect beings and x and y are beings therefore x affects y, when x is material or physical and y is immaterial or nonphysical is tautological, question begging.
I would say that your follow-up point about Aristotle doesn't do justice to his view of beings. While substantialistic, they do not deny the influence beings can have upon one another.
I assume you are talking about my follow-up point to your statement: But this would not invalidate dualism, unless by such one means only static, inert beings. --- where I had written this:
quote: That's a good qualification and one of the reasons folks have had problems with classical aristotelianism and thomism. They were too substantialistic and implastic. Folks like Arraj have largely corrected that with a more robust and dynamic conceptualization of formative causation. Others have adopted more of a process-substantialist approach over against those that would still be considered too essentialistic (for some substance approaches) or nominalistic (for some process approaches, like Whitehead). Part of the problem has been that some have viewed thomism as a straightforward rendering of aristotelianism but that is decidedly not so, especially if existence, or esse, takes primacy over essence.
The substantialistic criticism does not have anything to do with causal efficacy of being on being. Of course Aristotle doesn't deny the influence of beings on one another. Any criticism would come from the opposite direction, in fact, that he goes to far in invoking their causal efficacy on one another. Again, vis a vis immaterial vs material. Science hasn't had much use, for example, for hundreds of years, for anything but efficient causation. Who needs formal and material and final causation? (Don't answer that. I rather like them myself, in a nunaced way.) Also, the criticism would have more so to do with what you talked about re: being too static and would have to do with being, as they say, too essentialistic. Those criticisms stick more to Aristotle and not Aquinas because Aquinas, properly considered, doesn't, in my view, mistreat the idea of essence, and further, there is no reason it cannot be viewed more dynamically (a la Arraj, for example).
Maybe Bernie can better address the causal closure issues since he seems to raise the objection more vigorously than I do, I suspect.
pax! Jb
Sorry, we do not permit the following HTML tag or attribute: Parenthesis in HTML tag
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Ahem -- that last posting was a result of Sorry, we can not process your request. The board administrator has enabled flood protection for this function. You must wait at least 60 seconds before trying this request again.
Note: Using your back button to return to the previous page may cause the data you were attempting to submit to be lost. Instead, you should use your browser's reload button when the time period has elapsed.
which happened as a result of that html tag problem
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
JB, I'll be playing catch up for the next couple of days, but I thank you for your generous responses. This might end up being way more complicated than I thought, as, for me, the term dualism was in opposition to monism and only implied God and created beings. So when you ask, It all depends on what you meant by being and creatures and also by dualism. Do you include supernatural creatures and immaterial substances, for example? Do souls exist apart from bodies? that's what I meant: God and created beings. BTW, I think the term "supernatural creatures" is an oxymoron, no?
Later . . . and thanks!
(I wonder what Bernie's thinking . . . Let's hear from you, Bernie.)
[ April 11, 2005, 10:06 PM: Message edited by: Phil ]
-------------------- "The Light shines on in darkness . . ." - John 1: 3 - Posts: 7539 | From: Wichita, KS | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by Phil: I thought the term supernatural only applied to the divine, and the term preternatural applied to those kinds of spiritual beings.
Perhaps we need to start a separate thread on idiosyncratic usages of words
Those terms are often used interchangeably but I would say the supernatural is a subcategory of the preternatural, the latter describing anything that is not natural and paranormal, the former especially pertaining to both the deity and divine activity, e.g. miracles, as well as angels, which would include Satan and his cohorts.
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
OK, OK, I was thinking mostly in terms of the order of grace, where the supernatural is contrasted with the natural. There is also the distinction you mention in terms of power, where the supernatural would refer to the divine, and preternatural to beings less than God. E.g., the demonic would be preternatural, the divine supernatural.
- - -
Addenda - it seems the scholastics pretty much used the term "supernatural" mostly with respect to the divine and not to the realm of angels and so forth except insofar as they were agents of supernatural grace. Modern parlance is another matter, I know, where some would consider even psychics to be in possession of supernatural powers. My "bible" in much of this is The Theology of Christian Perfection, by Royo and Aumann, which is a classical work on mystical theology. There, on p. 638, one will find the supernatura by reason of formal cause as the realm of God and God's actions (grace, infused virtues, gifts of the spirit, etc.). The "preternatural" is considered "relatively supernatural" in that it transcends the power of a creature but not the entire created order; the "absolutely supernatural" - God - transcends the entire created order in power. Similar to your note, JB. I've been using the term mostly with regard to the absolutely supernatural, which is why I said a supernatural creature was an oxymoron, and I've been using preternatural instead of "relatively supernatural."
[ April 12, 2005, 12:12 AM: Message edited by: Phil ]
-------------------- "The Light shines on in darkness . . ." - John 1: 3 - Posts: 7539 | From: Wichita, KS | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
JB, why would not intangibles like the noosphere, morphogenetic fields, etc. be considered part of the created order and, hence, within the dualistic perspective? I follow your point about a triadic dynamic, but I don't see the need to dismiss dualism.
[ April 12, 2005, 09:45 AM: Message edited by: Phil ]
-------------------- "The Light shines on in darkness . . ." - John 1: 3 - Posts: 7539 | From: Wichita, KS | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Okay, I’ve held back long enough. One of Merton’s clowns is just begging to alleviate this bout of intellectual earnestness.
The only type of duelism with which I am familiar:
Note that there is no causal disjunction problem with this model. Whether my wit (non-material) or my jabs (material), both are rapier-like.
Posts: 5365 | From: Washington State | Registered: Sep 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by Phil: JB, why would not intangibles like the noosphere, morphogenetic fields, etc. be considered part of the created order and, hence, within the dualistic perspective? I follow your point about a triadic dynamic, but I don't see the need to dismiss dualism.
There is a wide variety of phenomena that might be immaterial, nonphysical or intangible and part of the created order. Some think maybe even consciousness. These can't be a priori ruled out, although many in the scientistic cohort do dismiss such a priori . I can abide, for the most part, with a substance metaphysical account that is truly relational and dynamical. When it comes to dualistic interactionism, the robust Cartesian dualism (unintelligible, really) is indeed improved (softened) by an aristotelian thomism.
As for dualism, there are so many dualisms, it is difficult to carry on a coherent conversation about what it is we are dismissing or affirming. When we do affirm something dualistic, still, the etymological baggage of the word plus the manifold idiosyncratic usages of the word require us to append umpteen nuances, qualifications and predications to our statements in order to completely disambiguate what we mean.
Nevertheless, to be clear, I prefer to say 1) monism, alone, doesn't cut it as a good metaphysics 2) dualism, alone, doesn't cut it as a good metaphysics 3) pluralism, alone, doesn't cut it as a good metaphysics and 4) monism plus pluralism, together, (panen-theism) doesn't cut it as a good metaphysics. The best comprehensive metaphysics I've seen is pan-entheism, which is monistic and dualistic and pluralistic, none of these dynamics alone and none of them dissolved (dismissed) and none of them blended into the others, syncretistically, so as to be indistinguishable. Further, as far as the monadic and dyadic and triadic aspects of reality are concerned, each has its distinct semiotic and modal logic and epistemological/ontological categories, which is to say that our way of speaking about them changes --- now metaphorically, now literally, now analogically, now kataphatically, now apophatically, now eminently, now univocally, now relationally, now equivocally, ad nauseum.
People would have to be TOTALLY NUTS to want to try to carry on metaphysical discourse on Internet Discussion Boards, once you really think about --- a real sado-masochistic endeavor
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
In addition to the allegorical/credal, moral, anagogical and literal/historical meanings of scripture, there is the additional problem, as you know, of apophatic vs kataphatic description, as well as univocal/metaphorical, relational/literal and equivocal/analogical predications/speech. Insofar as the only univocity between us and God would present re: attributes, metaphorically at that, and insofar as there can only be equivocity between us and God re: our natures, analogically at that, then Paul's statement (a more ancient Greek quote, I believe) requires careful parsing.
I think the trick involves maintaining wholly otherness but in such a way that we don't negate relationality, which must be radically affirmed. A good theological accounting of this would probably require one to say: 1) At this point, I am speaking literally. 2) Now, I will speak allegorically. 3) I have just switched to metaphor and will segue into a simile. 4) This next paragraph will be anagogical and end with a moral message. 5) In this case, we are predicating this concept univocally and in the next we'll be predicting it equivocally, affirming the analogical aspect of this reality, which means that even our metaphorical account is weaker than first suspected. 6) By the way, the third sentence was an apophatic negation and the 8th was a kataphatic affirmation. 7) Finally, for these purposes, our modal logic has been amended from possible, actual and necessary to possible, actual and probable.
There is an alternative to this approach. Invite some friends over. Greet one another with a holy kiss. Have a meal. Share some stories and songs and wisdom. Experience reconciliation. Share prayers of praise and petition and intercession and thanksgiving. Exchange peace. Enjoy fellowship. Depart refreshed and renewed to serve others in compassion and with a firm resolve to return again to thus nurture and be nurtured.
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Good one, Brad! Thanks for the levity. I see you even happened to catch me scoring a point!
- - -
As for dualism, there are so many dualisms, it is difficult to carry on a coherent conversation about what it is we are dismissing or affirming. . .
I shared my meaning ealier in terms of "God and creation (or Existence and Essence, if you prefer)," and that's the usual way I take the term when alternatives to monism are being bantied around. I don't at all follow what you mean by "pluralism," here, as I have no idea what else there might be besides God and creation. Anyway, I agree with you on panentheism, which I view as a type of dualism affirming a dynamic interplay between God and creation.
Anyhoo . . . I don't know where else to go with this. Oh: There is an alternative to this approach. . . Ahh yes! Off to get my guitar and Kumbaya sheet music!
The efforts to reach understanding about metaphysics are worthwhile, imo. After all, why do we have questions about these matters in the first place if not to puruse a deeper understanding of truth and reality?
-------------------- "The Light shines on in darkness . . ." - John 1: 3 - Posts: 7539 | From: Wichita, KS | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by Phil: As for dualism, there are so many dualisms, it is difficult to carry on a coherent conversation about what it is we are dismissing or affirming. . .
I shared my meaning ealier in terms of "God and creation (or Existence and Essence, if you prefer)," and that's the usual way I take the term when alternatives to monism are being bantied around. I don't at all follow what you mean by "pluralism," here, as I have no idea what else there might be besides God and creation. Anyway, I agree with you on panentheism, which I view as a type of dualism affirming a dynamic interplay between God and creation.
Well, Phil, I suppose I simply did not follow why you, then, had written: I follow your point about a triadic dynamic, but I don't see the need to dismiss dualism. , after I had already clarified that I, and most philosophers, more broadly conceived dualism, most forms of which are very problematical, and especially insofar as I didn't think that I had dismissed dualism in the more narrow sense you were giving it. I know I had otherwise qualified that no metaphysics were tenable in the sense that they gifted us with explanatory adequacy and falsifiability like scientific hypotheses.
Speaking metaphysically, and ontologically, there are many forms of naturalistic dualism and dualistic naturalism, which, for instance, see consciousness as a primitive (Ayn Rand for one). Also, Chalmers and Searle in the philosophy of mind and others, especially emergentists, suggest dualistic accounts. One can, and many do, affirm dualism without that being dispositive of a deity whatsoever. It has nothing to do with God talk, strictly speaking.
Some, mostly materialists, go further to posit a transcendent realm such as a multiverse, which is really-real, but not empirically testable (just like we posit God). It would be indirectly verifiable, you know, such as with any effects proceeding from an otherwise veiled cause. It may not be a bad hypothesis at that, metaphysically speaking. Why couldn't there be other singularities like the Big Bang with their own universe but not consisting of primitives like space, time and substance?
At any rate, in order to deal with this ontological multiplication, I find it useful to provide for the possibility, probability even, that there is an Uncreated Order and a created order. Monistically speaking, monadically, I could affirm some univocity of being vis a vis the attributes and relationality of these orders. In the created order, there could be all sorts of universes, some interacting, some not, made of various givens: different primitives, forces and axioms. This would be a pluralistic multiverse. In the created order, in our universe, specifically, also, we still cannot a priori rule out ontological dualism, what we were distinguishing between preternatural and natural and supernatural, and perhaps even in the philosophy of mind area (although the eveidence seems increasingly against this notion, but who knows with emergentistic properties of mind?).
So, I concede to my materialist friends their monistic and pluralistic notions. Some of them are very much in earnest as scientists in proposing string theories and multiverses and many worlds (quantum). Some, however, are merely parodying Christian metaphysics and analogy of being with our transcendent reality, placing such transcendence in a nontheistic realm of reality. Whatever the case may be, then, the God hypothesis remains a robust hypothesis because I still think a properly nuanced pan-entheism, makes more sense (better handles those paradoxes: infinite regress, causal disjunct, circular reference) than simply a universe sandwiched in between a cosmological multiverse and a quantum many worlds.
So, what you get is a weak monistic/monadic aspect that is univocal re: attributes and the distinct possibility of some very naturalistic dualism, maybe in the philosophy of mind area and maybe elsewhere, too, as well as some good working hypotheses of a multiverse transcending it all, pluralistically. And all of this is being discussed all of the time in a completely naturalistic sense by scientists and philosophers without bringing God into the picture at all. Add God and you not only have an analogy of being. You have an analogies of analogies of being, which is quite okay with me.
quote:Originally posted by Phil: The efforts to reach understanding about metaphysics are worthwhile, imo. After all, why do we have questions about these matters in the first place if not to puruse a deeper understanding of truth and reality?
I sure am glad you think so for no one has hurled more electrons toward SPlace re: same than mois. At the same time, I am afraid I have turned Bernie's thread radioactive. If I've lost y'all in my incoherence, I take responsibility for that. It would be nothing new. I had firmly resolved to eschew this line but responded to a request ...
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
re: that's the usual way I take the term when alternatives to monism are being bantied around
I'll try to remember that and also Bernie's way of taking the term pantheism. For my part, I'm sticking with Merriam-Webster's online ... you guys (Northern speak) ;-P
Or, from the old Catholic Encyclopedia: The term Monism is not much used in theology because of the confusion to which its use would lead
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
I sure am glad you think so [Big Grin] for no one has hurled more electrons toward SPlace re: same than mois. At the same time, I am afraid I have turned Bernie's thread radioactive. If I've lost y'all in my incoherence, I take responsibility for that. It would be nothing new. I had firmly resolved to eschew this line but responded to a request ... [Cool]
Well, like I've said before, JB, you take these matters to the "next level," which I consider a "pro-level." It's always interesting and instructive to read how these matters are nuanced and discussed at that level, and I always come away better for having made the effort to understand.
Also from the old encyclopedia: Monism is a philosophical term which, in its various meanings, is opposed to Dualism or Pluralism, so I don't think we were too far afield in our use of terminology. Also: Wherever pluralistic philosophy distinguishes a multiplicity of things, Monism denies that the manifoldness is real, and holds that the apparently many are phases, or phenomena, of a one. Wherever dualistic philosophy distinguishes between body and soul, matter and spirit, object and subject, matter and force, the system which denies such a distinction, reduces one term of the antithesis to the other, or merges both in a higher unity, is called Monism. . .
But, Christian philosophy holds, the real extends beyond the domain of the (finite) rational. Reality eludes our attempt to compress it within the categories which we frame for it. Consequently, Dualism is often the final answer in philosophy; and Monism, which is not content with the partial synthesis of Dualism, but aims at an ideal completeness, often results in failure. Dualism leaves room for faith, and hands over to faith many of the problems which philosophy cannot solve. Monism leaves no room for faith. The only mysticism that is compatible with it is rationalistic, and very different from that "vision" in which, for the Christian mystic, all the limitations, imperfections, and other shortcomings of our feeble efforts are removed by the light of faith. - http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10483a.htm
Those are the kinds of considerations I had in mind in my stubborn and sometimes clumsy defense of dualism, but I realize they less grounded in clear philosophical reasoning than in intuitions about consequences for spiritual practice.
[ April 13, 2005, 11:04 AM: Message edited by: Phil ]
-------------------- "The Light shines on in darkness . . ." - John 1: 3 - Posts: 7539 | From: Wichita, KS | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
To draw all of this together in a more concrete and less abstract way, some may be interested in this article: http://www.tcrnews2.com/Cosmos9.html , which is little more up to date than the 1911 Catholic Encyclopedia.
Although I say more concrete, this deals with theoretical physics, which for some, perhaps most, remains pretty darned abstract:
quote: Many physicists believe they have arrived at the Theory of Everything (TOE) in a Grand Unified Theory (GUT) that explains and unites all the forces of nature right back to the first trillionths of a second after the “Big Bang.” In order to do this their mathematical equations require seven extra dimensions besides time and space; dimensions which are no longer visible, experiential, or accessible to us. These mainstream scientists even refer to these extra dimensions as “higher” dimensions and speak of parallel universes (or a multiverse). In fact, according to M-Theory (as derived from String Theory and the influence of Super Gravity theories), these dimensions are right next to us, but closed off to us ever since the first trillionths of a second after the Big Bang. These now mainstream physicists, teaching at the most elite and secular universities, even believe they may be on the verge of proving the existence of these theoretical extra dimensions as early as 2007 when the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) comes on line with CERN (Center European Research Nuclear); designed to verify the existence of the as of yet unverified “gravitino” (alleged Supersymmetry (SUSY) partner of the graviton) which allegedly “leaks” into these other extra dimensions and explains the apparent weakness of gravity when writing equations to unify it with the other forces.
So, since we have always affirmed, in our openness to dualism, the possibility of invisible and inaccessible realms, nothing really new to Catholic Christians here. And if the M-theory described above turns out to be workable or not, it is really of no great moment either, theologically, insofar as we do not place God in such gaps, predicating God's reality in the same way we do created realities.
The author goes on:
quote: It should not sound too crazy to Christians. We have always believed in the angelic creatures who dwell in dimensions beyond ours and who are not of this spatial or material world. We have always believed in the existence and operation of the spiritual soul and its survival even apart from the body with which it came in to a unified existence. Where do angels operate? Where does the soul exist or operate as the form of the body? M-Theory may provide additional food for thought to Catholic teaching in these areas of belief and may well be a real shot in the arm to Christian anthropology and angelology if Christians do not let themselves get muscled-out of the debate. Many of the theoretical mathematicians do not seem to understand the possibilities of these theoretical extra dimensions and what is in them any better than metaphysicians.
Although M-theory may provide food for thought, it would be important that we not our imaginations run too very wild in what the possibilities of these theoretical extra dimensions could be. Or, rather, we can let our imaginations run wild, but we must be careful in parsing our terms, nuancing our meanings and predicating our conceptualizations. For example, if there is a multiverse or even multiverses, some forever wholly inaccessible and invisible to our own and only verifiable/falsifiable through indirect evidence, then we have inserted an analogy of being (through which we would know these dimensions' causes only through their effects, ergo, only able to speak of their attributes but not their essential natures) between us and our analogy of Being (through which we know God as Veiled Cause only through God's effects, ergo, only able to speak of His attributes but not Her essential nature). Does that make sense?
He closes with a discussion of Godel and Jaki, two of my favorites:
quote: we can never be sure we have the final Theory of Everything. Stanley Jaki, a distinguished priest, theologian, and highly respected physicist is fond of reminding the scientific community of Gödel’s theorem. In his article, “A Late Awakening to Gödel in Physics,” Father Jaki explains the insight of the theorem in an attempt to remind physicists of its implications:
no non-trivial system of arithmetic propositions can have its proof of consistency within itself, all systems of mathematics fall under this restriction, because all embody higher mathematics that ultimately rests on plain arithmetic. Then it follows that there can be no final physical theory which would be necessarily true at least in its mathematical part.[2] According to Jaki, this does not mean “that a final theory of fundamental particles [is]not possible to formulate,” but that, “when it is on hand one cannot know rigorously that it is a final theory.”[3]
The old saying that, on our early journey, faith is clear but tentative, and, on our later journey, faith is obscure but certain, reminds me of Godel. Clear but tentative reminds me of complete but inconsistent. And obscure but certain reminds me of consistent but incomplete . I think faith call us to embrace the consistent but incomplete even as it does not counsel us to desist in our attempts for complete accounts, physically or metaphysically or theologically.
Faith remains an indispensable aspect of the human evaluative continuum, the human knowledge manifold. That is why we run into ineluctable paradox no matter what our metaphysical system is: infinite regress, causal disjunction and circular referentiality. Part of this inescabale paradox is grounded in ultimate reality's elusivity and part in our human finitude. This paradox confronts us in our attempts to formalize and prove our systems but it does not prevent us from seeing ultimate truths, only from proving them, does not prevent us from formulating them only keeps from rigorously knowing they are on hand. Hence, we must taste and see the goodness of the Lord. We know there is a nonparadoxical perspective that exists in the Coincidentia Oppositorum as experienced by the Consistent Comprehender of Total Reality. The journey becomes our destination and the quest, itself, becomes our grail, for we would not be even searching if we had not already been found.
It is in our very asking that we reveal our belief in the Answer. Paradox would not be experience-able as paradox if we did not already know at some level that 1) we cannot escape all paradox, just some, even as 2) all paradox is indeed escapable (by anyOne Who can get properly situated vis a vis Total Reality).
Fun stuff, to me. It cannot be had just rationally, however.
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
re: less grounded in clear philosophical reasoning than in intuitions about consequences for spiritual practice.
Regarding pluralism, and yet another type of dualism, we haven't rationally eliminated the possibility of more than one deity.
Regarding transcendence, even as we affirm a form of dualism, we haven't rationally eliminated the possibility that it resides solely in a putative multiverse/many worlds, not rather ultimately in a deity.
Regarding dualism and the deity, we haven't rationally eliminated the possibility of deism.
When it comes down to many competing meta-theories of reality, all of which can be equally logically consistent, internally coherent and externally congruent, we subconsciously run a reductio ad abusurdum analysis against them and choose one that best matches our intuitions. Employing our intuitions regarding the consequences of these various competing theories for meaning in life and growth of all sorts: intellectual, affective, social, moral, etc is exactly how we ultimately ground our positions. We most definitely and inescapably employ our entire human knowledge manifold, the entire human evaluative continuum, in approaching all truth and anyone who denies the indispensable role played by the prerational and nonrational is being hyper-rational or rationalistic, and conversely, anyone who denies the indispensable role played by inference is being fideistic.
I would say that coupling intuitions about consequences for spiritual practice (fullest realization of our humanity) with clear reasoning is the BEST way to ground our choices for metaphysical systems and theological conclusions. Orthopraxis authenticates orthodoxy, which is to say, in some qualified manner, that if it is true it is going to be useful toward those ends. (This as distinguished, of course, from any unnuanced utilitarianism or coarse pragmatism).
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
posted
Regarding pluralism, and yet another type of dualism, we haven't rationally eliminated the possibility of more than one deity. . .
That part was taken care of in that Bernie made it clear that he was working within a Christian paradigm, where we accept monotheism as a "given." Same goes for some of the other points you're making above. This is not one of those "other forums" or lists where you have to work so hard to justify every little point and word to advance a millimeter in understanding. Given a shared acceptance of the Christian mysteries, revelation, etc., a different kind of work emerges, which is to see what we can understand within this context. So relax, ol' buddy; you're among friends, here.
The M-theory material is interesting. It's intriguing to see how many traditional Christian teachings on angels and invisible realms are beginning to seem as though they might be scientifically tenable.
[ April 13, 2005, 04:29 PM: Message edited by: Phil ]
-------------------- "The Light shines on in darkness . . ." - John 1: 3 - Posts: 7539 | From: Wichita, KS | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
quote:Originally posted by Phil: This is not one of those "other forums" or lists where you have to work so hard to justify every little point and word to advance a millimeter in understanding.
quote:Originally posted by Phil: The M-theory material is interesting. It's intriguing to see how many traditional Christian teachings on angels and invisible realms are beginning to seem as though they might be scientifically tenable.
Well, look at it this way. At the very least, some scientists are invoking invisible and inaccessible realms that are variously, more or less, related to our own but otherwise only gifting us knowledge of their attributes as we observe effects of their veiled causes. What we end up with is an epistemological parity whereby we can say that, metaphysically, we are employing the same analogical knowledge thru indirect evidence as they are employing in their theoretical physics.
For now, anyway, it doesn't so much make metaphysics more scientifically tenable (which is why it is called metaphysics, by definition) as it more clearly reveals that the silent (even denied) presuppositions of science are more metaphysical than many scientists have been willing to admit.
What happens is our analogies become more robust. We might not, for instance, learn anything new under the sun about angels, but we might be able to say that what it is we believe that angels do and about the way they operate is something like that other phenomenon you (Mr. Scientists) are trying to describe. IOW, it gives us a tu quoque argument about knowledge thru analogy.
At the same time, with advances in knowledge and methodology, there is no reason to a priori rule out the possibility that our ability to measure indirect evidence and its statistical significance will advance exponentially to the point where, exactly as you say, teachings on angels and invisible realms [would begin] to seem as though they might be scientifically tenable. At least they would be even more hypothetically consonant even if not more empirically verifiable.
Alas, though, one must know how hard jb must work in any forum to advance in mutual understanding ... but ... relatively speaking ... this is a walk in the park
Don't you know it's gonna be alright-John Lennon And you will know that all manner of things shall be well-Julian of Norwich Posts: 2881 | Registered: Aug 2001
| IP: Logged |
I’ve read from the links you provided but don’t really think of my views in terms of the depth of epistemological categories you’ve presented. First, I’m not a scholar, and don’t have the time, energy or intellect to devote to finding a “box” this size to place my beliefs in; second, am satisfied that my being shortsighted in this area is at least partly justified by the fact that certitude about such things is conspicuously absent—as appears to be true of all knowledge that departs the realm of empirical investigation and enters the abstract. Any time I run into (or am forced to describe) principles that necessitate phrases like, “appears to be” or “seems to approximate” or the like, I know that, while important to the clarity of discussion, such categories—general objective consensus aside—quickly become widely subjective. Epistemological coherence is, as they say, in the eye of the beholder. Or maybe they say something else….. Anyway, Aristotle, Paul of Tarsus, Aquinas and lots of others seem to have passed the same test of reasonable logical warrant outside scholarship of this depth—the unity of truth with true knowledge seems to establish/define its own reasonable and legitimate standards, even in the minds of common folk.
So, epistemological justification of the sort you refer to will have to be left to the judgment of those with more grey matter than I have available to me for everyday use.
Thanks, too, for your explanation of the various belief systems, it was helpful and I found my own leanings from this menu. -------------------------------------------------
Hello Phil,
I’m enjoying discussion here, even if not finding enough time to post very often. Not used to such close scrutiny. Most theology boards are populated by ‘steak and potatoes’ lay (or lame) ‘theologians’ like me. Not used to someone asking such penetrating questions, delving so deeply into my belief system. I enjoy the test, but see I’m going to have to be more careful in my wording. You’re right that my reference to monism was, by technical standards, idiosyncratic. My personal theology has been torn apart and reassembled (still in progress) the last few years, and I reserve the right to change, by either addition or subtraction, my religious views on an hour-by-hour basis. My comment about information as reality being monistic was not an expression of my current beliefs, merely an acknowledgement of a peripheral relationship between the two.
I can find nothing to disagree with in your post. The “sticking point” of union between God and creature, as you call it, exists at all only because it’s an area I’m still exploring, though am doing so from the following foundation...harvested from johnboy’s samplings...
1) realist in both mediaeval and modern senses, and, 2) pan-entheist, with exploration going on as noted above and in earlier posts
These are the positions I find myself most closely resembling. You seem to have the luxury of many years studying these things, and here I’m at a disadvantage; I only completed the 9th grade (was a wild child) and am self-educated. Also never read any philosophy until coming across and falling in love with Aquinas’ views two years ago. His addition of the technical aspects of religious thought was an instant and natural enhancement to my former, largely emotional/Protestant/Biblical theology. Forgive my inconsistencies in advance, please. Self-education necessarily bypasses a lot of background and can make for some stumbling blocks in dialog, as those we’re having now.
My understanding of reality at its base level as information came from a simultaneous twofold set of circumstances:
1) frustration with the ploy of atheists on theology boards who in their best physicalist battle gear consistently refuse legitimacy to the reality of the incorporeal. I’ve seen these folks time and again invite Christians not versed in the basic philosophical concepts get lured into arenas in which only matter is allowed authenticity, then invited to argue their religion from this restrictive base, and, 2) intrigue with Thomas’ notion of knower and known actually investing/enduing one another.
From the starting point of mutually existing internal and external corporeal and incorporeal substances, and recognizing that there was no common denominator for these in time and space for investiture of the sort Thomas seemed to contend for, I reduced reality and existence [as I understand it] to the lowest possible common denominator which would work for all parties involved—particular, universal, God, created intellect, demon, angel, matter, spirit, etc. Information seems to be the only term to fulfill this adequately. All reality seems to me to find a commonality, a conjoint existence as information. I use a sort of reverse question when this concept is dismissed as irrelevant by others (which is often): think of a way that things that exist are not information and explain how they are not. Looking at reality from this angle serves to support the notion even more.
Information, of course, has a dual nature. Without getting into the various kinds of dualism (theology still forming), ran into the terms “thatness” and “whatness” [I think it might have been in some of Arraj’s writings], and derived meaning (what) from information (that). Mostly, information and meaning operate as the dual nature of reality as thing and attribute(s). Both body and spirit consist of an informational structure, though of obviously different types. It seems to me that if information itself is real existence, then all the information the created intellect is able to apprehend as an intelligible object or species, must have “real existence” of some sort. This is fodder for another discussion, and certainly one of the more controversial of my beliefs, as you can doubtless guess.
I see good and evil as a “true” or “false” property of information, or a type of meaning or whatness which attaches to it. False information denies a thing its perfection, while true information is perfect information. In matter, the false information of cancer, which cells are themselves a form of information, provide a “meaning” to the individual as that which prevents the perfection of health. St. Thomas writes, “...we must observe that evil may be considered either as in a substance or as in its action. In a substance, there is evil through its lacking something natural and due to it.” (SCG, chap. V). This notion is pretty central to my view of salvation, more about which later, if we get that far. Thomas’ notion of evil as unintentional works well here, in time and space, as he states, “Defect in effect and action results from defect in the principles of action. Thus a monstrosity results from a defect in the seed, and limping results from a curvature of the leg.” (SCG, chapter IV). These are to me representations of the technical aspect of the evil of false information at work in matter.
The extent to which human spirit consists of false information (unregenerate essence; the principle of spiritual death) defines one’s spiritual pathology, from which sin arises and in which external evil [Satan] finds a willing bond (Jn 8:44). Here, Thomas and I disagree [if I understand him correctly], as he states that movement in intention is not caused by universals but by singulars, in act, which appears to me to contradict Jesus’ words in Mark 7:20-23: “And He was saying, "That which proceeds out of the man, that is what defiles the man. For from within, out of the heart of men, proceed the evil thoughts, fornications, thefts, murders, adulteries, deeds of coveting and wickedness, as well as deceit, sensuality, envy, slander, pride and foolishness. All these evil things proceed from within and defile the man.”
Actually, I think epistemic coherence breaks down here in both Thomas’ and modern Christianity’s view, because causal sequence in Adam’s fall is, as Jesus taught, from heart (spirit and/or mind, depending on one’s view) outward; Adam didn’t die physically for many hundreds of years according to Biblical chronology, but lost relationship (died or introduced false information to spirit) with God upon sinning, and was immediately driven from the garden. In this, I see the pattern of causal relationship in sin from universal (spirit) to particular (act). In the popular view that spirit is wholly and completely animated in regeneration in a single event, evil loses this connection. I’m not sure of Catholic teaching on this subject, but many Protestants look to Paul’s teaching of “spirit and flesh”, assigning sin committed after the new birth to the physical realm, to some indistinct arena within or at least called, the “flesh”…or to the particulars of act, which is even worse, logically. The notion of fragmented spirit and progressive regeneration restores continuity to this teaching, as I see it.
As a fragmented whole, the multiplicity of information of human spirit consists in an admixture of true and false—good and evil—which provide the primary causal force for human behavior. Its theological dualism of good and evil with a new wrinkle, sprinkling it throughout a multi-structured idea of human spirit. Spirit’s information existing in a state of multiplicity might be thought of as something like the physical body existing as a whole made up of a multitude of components (cells). This is probably the most unorthodox aspect of my theology, because the modern view in Christianity of the new birth as instantaneous and complete seems to hold wide acceptance.
This is getting too long. Second part below...
Posts: 32 | From: midwest US | Registered: Mar 2005
| IP: Logged |
. Shalom Place
UBBFriend: Email this page to someone!
Printer-friendly view of this topic
![[Wink]](wink.gif)
![[Smile]](smile.gif)
![[Eek!]](eek.gif)
![[Razz]](tongue.gif)
![[Big Grin]](biggrin.gif)
![[Frown]](frown.gif)
![[Cool]](cool.gif)
![[Confused]](confused.gif)
